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NOVEMBER-DEcEMBER, 1961
CASE COMMENTS
EMINENT DOMAIN - HEALTH - STATUTES
Petitioners owned property in an area which had been desig-
nated as slum and blighted by the Denver Urban Renewal Au-
thority. The Authority proposed to acquire much of the area by
either condemnation or purchase and then resell the acquired
properties to private interests to redevelop for commercial, resi-
dential or industrial use, in accordance with the Urban Renewal
Law.1 In an original proceeding, the Colorado Supreme Court held
that the Urban Renewal Law was constitutional and did not author-
ize the acquisition of private property for private use. Rabinoff v.
District Court, 360 P. 2d 114 (Colo. 1961).
The holding in the principal case is in accord with the over-
whelming weight of authority. Urban redevelopment laws 2 have
been enacted in over half the states, and have been upheld in one
form or another, in all but two states.
Urban redevelopment has been most frequently attacked on
the ground that it permits the taking of private property for private
use and is, therefore, unconstitutional. The courts have had little
difficulty in disposing of this argument. It has been repeatedly
held that the primary purpose of urban redevelopment is the
elimination of slum and blight. 4 The property is, therefore, being
acquired for public use, and the subsequent transfer of the property
to private interests is ancillary and does not defeat the public use
involved.
5
It has been urged that slum clearance can be achieved through
measures less drastic than eminent domain, such as zoning, building
and health laws. The courts have rejected this argument, saying
that the determination of whether a public use is involved is a
judicial question, but the selection of the means by which slum
clearance is to be accomplished is strictly within the province of
the legislature. 6
Once it has been determined that the taking of the property is
for public use, the argument that urban redevelopment allows
public funds to be used for private purposes obviously falls. 7
Another popular and equally unavailing attack on urban rede-
velopment has been that it constitutes an unlawful delegation of
authority from the legislature to the redevelopment agency. This
argument has rarely been upheld.8 If the statute lays down basic
standards for the determination of slum and blighted areas and a
reasonably definite policy for the administration of the law, it
generally will not be declared to be an unlawful delegation of
I Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 58 at 289.
2 Urban redevelopment has been described as "a plan for the redevelopment, for all types of
uses, of areas suffering from blight or decay, through a program of co-operation between govern-
ment and private enterprise. The former contributes its power of eminent domain to assemble the
needed parcels of land . . . The actual redevelopment is performed by private enterprise." Brown,
Urban Redevelopment, 29 B.U.L. Rev. 321 (1949).
3 Rabinoff v. District Court, 360 P.2d 114, 120 (Colo. 1961).
4 Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1953), aff'd, Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954); Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 (1954);
Foeller v. Housing of Portland, 198 Ore. 205, 256 P.2d 752 (1953).
5 Ibid.
6 Hunter v. Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Agency, 195 Va. 326, 98 S.E.2d 893 (1953):
7 See 44 A.L.R.2d 1431 (1955).
8 Id. at 1427.
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authority.9 The courts, in construing these statutes, have taken
into consideration the fact that it is impossible to set up standards
for slum and blighted areas with mathematical preciseness. 10 Also,
the courts have been less strict in requiring specific standards in
these laws since they are closely related to public welfare. The
result is that the typical urban redevelopment law is rather broad
and general, and the finding of the agency as to what areas may
be selected for redevelopment is conclusive, unless clearly fraudu-
lent or capricious.
There is little agreement among the courts as to the nature
and conditions of the areas which may properly be the subject of
redevolpment. Some courts have held that only slum or blighted
areas, insofar as they affect the public health and welfare, may be
taken. 2 Other decisions have allowed the acquisition of lands that
threaten to become slums or blighted.1 3 Areas characterized by
obsolete platting, faulty lot layout, deterioration of site and di-
versity of ownership may legally be the subject of redevelopment. 4
An area consisting of eighty-five percent vacant land was all owed
to be taken on the basis of "compelling economic need."15 In short,
the courts have run the gamut on this particular aspect of urban
redevelopment.
However, the courts are agreed upon the fact that urban rede-
velopment is to be conducted on an area basis. Thus, it generally
makes little difference that an area slated for redevelopment in-
cludes several structures which are not substandard.16 It is the
area as a whole that governs the decision.
In only four states has the attack on urban redevelopment met
with any appreciable degree of success. South Carolina has flatly
declared urban redevelopment unconstitutional in that it permits
the taking of private property for private use.1 7 Georgia has held
it invalid for the same reason.' Subsequently, however, the Georgia
constitution was amended so as to allow such legislation. 9 Wash-
ington declared unconstitutional an act authorizing a port authority
to create industrial development districts by condemnation of
marginal lands which were being utilized for residential and agri-
cultural purposes. 2 Involved here was not the typical urban rede-
velopment law designed to eliminate slum and blight. Rather, the
law was enacted to create attractive industrial sites. Florida has
indicated that urban redevelopment statutes and their proposed
anplications are to be carefully analyzed. Where the area is only
bliahted and is to be redeveloped for industrial use, and there is
little evidence that it is a menace to public health and welfare,
there is not sufficient public use involved to justify eminent do-
main proceedings. The defects can be adequately cured through
9 Velishka v. City of Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 106 A.2d 571, 44 A.L.R.2d 1406 (1954).
10 Opinion to Governor, 76 R.I. 249, 69 A.2d 531 (1949).
I1 Alonel Corp. v. Indiana Redevelopment Comm'n, 154 N.E.2d 515 (Ind. 1958).
12 Crommett v. City of Portland, 150 Me. 217, 107 A.2d 841 (1954).
13 People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicoqao, 3 111.2d 593, 121 N.E.2d 791 (1954).
14 Oliver v. City of Clairton, 374 Pa. 333, 98 A.2d 47 (1953). Contra, Randolph v. Wilmington
Housing Authority, 139 A.2d 476 (Del. 1958).
15 Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 122 CaI.App.2d 777, 266 P.2d 105 (1954). But See Beebe
Improvement Co. v. City of New York, 129 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1954).
16 Kaskel v. Impelliteri, 306 N.Y. 73, 115 N.E.2d 659 (1953).
17 Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956).
18 Housing Authority v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 74 S.E.2d 891 (1953).
19 Bailey v. Housing Authority, 214 Ga. 790, 107 S.E.2d 812 (1959).
20 Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash.2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959).
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the use of existing health, building and zoning laws.21 But where
the area is clearly a slum and is to be converted into a residential
area, the use of eminent domain is justified.
2 2
There is little doubt that desirable results have been achieved
by the judicial decisions declaring urban redevelopment to be valid.
The need for it is great, and it can be a very useful tool if used
wisely. The application of these laws is fraught with obvious diffi-
culties. Especially difficult is the determination of what areas may
properly be redeveloped. It is impossible to set up rigid points of
demarcation in regard to this particular problem, and the existing
decisions indicate that, in most instances, any doubts are to be re-
solved in favor of the redevelopment agency, not the property
owner. There is a constant danger that needless harm and suffering
will be wrought by an abuse of authority or a lenient court.
Robert Holt
21 Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
22 Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency, 115 So.2d 745 (Fla. 1959).
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